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After an inadmissible confession.

After an inadmissible confession

After an inadmissible confession

  1. bestmilitarydefensedefenseattorneys10.02.25PMcopyQuestion first tactic. Missouri v. Seibert , 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Police engaged in a common interrogation tactic of questioning the suspect. Once they obtained the confession, they would read the suspect her rights, get a waiver, and then obtain a second confession. The Supreme Court held that the warned confession was inadmissible, since the police’s deliberate tactic of withholding
    Miranda warnings elicited an initial confession that was used to undermine the “comprehensibility and efficacy” of the subsequent
    Miranda warnings. Under the circumstances of the case, the Court concluded that it would have been reasonable for the suspect to regard the two phases of the interrogation as a continuum, especially since the officer referred back to the earlier admissions. The mere recital of Miranda warnings in the middle of this continuous interrogation was not sufficient to separate the two phases in suspect’s mind. Therefore, she would have concluded that it would be unnatural for her not to repeat the same information she had just given. She would not have understood that she had a choice about continuing to talk.
  2. Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 (1985). “A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite
    Miranda warnings.” “Administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.” However, no cleansing warning required. See also United States v. Lichtenhan , 40 M.J. 466 (C.M.A. 1994).
  3. United States v. Phillips , 32 M.J. 76 (C.M.A. 1991). An unwarned statement obtained without actual coercion does not presumptively taint a subsequent, warned statement. Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, however, that the warned statement was voluntary and was not obtained by using the earlier statement. If the initial statement is the product of actual coercion, duress, or inducement, it presumptively taints subsequent warned statements. Cleansing warnings, although not legally required, will help show voluntariness. Cf United States v. Torres , 60 M.J. 559 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
  4. United States v. Steward , 31 M.J. 259 (C.M.A. 1990). Mere “technical violations of Article 31(b)” do not presumptively taint subsequent warned statements. The appropriate legal inquiry in these types of cases is whether his subsequent confession was voluntary considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the earlier technical violation of Article 31(b).
  5. United States v. Brisbane , 63 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Where an earlier statement is “involuntary” only because the accused has not been properly warned of his Article 31(b) rights, the voluntariness of the second statement is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The earlier unwarned statement is a factor in this total picture, but it does not presumptively taint the subsequent statement. If a “cleansing warning” has been given — where the accused is advised that a previous statement cannot be used against him — that statement should be taken into consideration. If a cleansing statement is not given, however, its absence is not fatal to a finding of voluntariness.
  6. United States v. Gardinier , 65 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 2007), rev’d on other grounds , 67 M.J. 304 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Suspect provided two incriminating statements to civilian investigators following a proper
    Miranda rights warning. Immediately after making these statements, a CID agent entered the interview room, identified himself, and obtain a third incriminating statement without advising the suspect of his Article 31 rights. Four days later, the suspect was called to the CID office and advised that his prior statement was given with what “may not have been a proper rights advisement.” The suspect was then asked whether he would be willing to make another statement. He did. While the court suppressed the first (unwarned) statement to CID, the second statement was found to be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances despite the fact the accused had not been specifically informed that his first statement to CID might be inadmissible.
  7. United States v. Young , 49 M.J. 265 (C.A.A.F. 1998). A two-day period was enough to purge the taint from the previous inadmissible confession. See also United States v. Ford , 51 M.J. 445 (C.A.A.F. 1999);
    United States v. Allen , 59 M.J. 478 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v. Cuento , 60 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
  8. Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Police failure to advise appellant of his right to appointed counsel did not require that the testimony of a witness identified in appellant’s statement be suppressed.