Impersonating an officer, warrant officer, or noncommissioned officer. UCMJ Art. 134
The offense does not depend upon the accused deriving a benefit from the deception or upon some third party being misled, but rather upon whether the acts and conduct would adversely influence the good order and discipline of the armed forces. United States v. Messenger , 6 C.M.R. 21 (C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Frisbie , 29 M.J. 974 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990); Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 726 (2d ed., 1920 Reprint); MCM, pt. IV, 86c(1); TJAGSA Practice Note, Impersonating an Officer and the Overt Act Requirement , Army Law., Jul. 1990, at 42 (discussing Frisbie ).
Intent. Intent to defraud may be plead and proven as an aggravating factor. MCM, pt. IV, 86b.
Related Offenses. Impersonating an officer, warrant officer, or noncommissioned officer differs from the offense of impersonating a CID agent or other agent of the federal government, in that the accused is not required to act out the part of the officer. Instead, merely posing as an officer is sufficient. United States v. Felton , 31 M.J. 526 (A.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Wesley , 12 M.J. 886 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Reece , 12 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Adams , 14 M.J. 647 (A.C.M.R. 1982); see also TJAGSA Practice Note, Impersonating a CID Agent and the Overt Act Requirement , Army Law., Mar. 1991, at 21 (discusses Felton ); Cooper, Persona Est Homo Cum Statu Quodam Consideratus , Army Law., April 1981, at 17.