Partial mental responsibility
A mental condition not amounting to a general lack of mental responsibility under subsection RCM 916(k)(1) is not a defense, nor is evidence of such a mental condition admissible as to whether the accused entertained a state of mind necessary to be proven as an element of the offense . RCM 916(k)(2). The old standard tried to prohibit a partial mental responsibility defense.
- The CMA rejected the old RCM 916(k)(2) because it doubted the rule’sconstitutionality and found that the legislative history of the federal model lacked any Congressional intent to preclude defendants from attacking mens rea with contrary evidence.
- Psychiatric testimony or evidence that serves to negate a specific intent is admissible. Ellis v. Jacob , 26 M.J. 90 (C.M.A. 1988); see United States v. Berri , 33 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Mansfield , 38 M.J. 415, 419 n.5 (C.M.A. 1993); see also United States v . Cameron , 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Pohlot , 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Gold , 661 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Frisbee , 623 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1985)